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23 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
CRIMINAL

LAW-MOTOR

VEHICLES-OPERATION

WITHOUT

FAULT.-[Massachusetts]
A state which we have been taught
to be proud of in connection with its laws and courts one day
chanced to pass the following legislation:
"Whoever upon any way operates a motor vehicle recklessly,
or so that the lives or safety of the public might be endangered, .
shall be punished by a fine of not less than twenty nor more than two
hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not less than two weeks, nor
more than two years, or both. ..

"I

There is more by way of penalty in the possibility of the person's
license being revoked.
In Commonwealth v. Gurney2 the defendant testified (correctly we assume) that he was driving a five and a half ton truck
on a highway, the macadam part of which was twenty-one feet,
ten inches wide. There was a four inch white line in or near the
center. About twenty or thirty feet away he saw another truck,
stationary, and facing the same direction that defendant was moving. The stationary truck was on the gravel shoulder of the highway with its left wheels about even with the macadam. At the
same time defendant saw about one hundred or one hundred and
twenty-five feet away a closed car traveling forty miles per hour
with its left wheels over on the left side of the white line. To
avoid this car he turned his truck to the right. At this time he
was from five to ten feet from the rear end of the other truck
which he struck a heavy blow and killed a man who was standing at the rear end of the stationary truck. Defendant was convicted under the statute set forth, not for recklessness, but for
the reason that he operated a motor vehicle "so that the lives or
safety of the public might be endangered." The Supreme Judicial Court overruled exceptions.
At first reading it seemed that Massachusetts had evolved
a curious and indefinite penal statute, one where no person of
ordinary wisdom, at least, could know the duty which it imposed.3
Any sort of driving might endanger the lives or safety of the
public. Danger lurks everywhere and injury happens sometimes
when there is no particular occasion to expect it.

However an examination of the few Massachusetts opinions
on this particular penal provision rather inclines the writer to
believe that the standard of conduct is definite rather than indefinite. 4 We are told that before a person is adjudged guilty
all the circumstances surrounding the affair are to be considered
1. Gen. Laws of Mass. (1921) ch. 90 sec. 240.

2. (Mass. 1927) 158 N. E. 832.

3. For discussions as to the validity and practicability of indefinite
expressions in statutes see: Aigler "Legislation in Vague Terms" 21 Mich.
Law Rev. 831, 843; Freund "Indefinite Terms in Statutes" 30 Yale Law Jour.

437, 443.

4. The reader is warned that: "A word is not crystal, transparent and
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color
and content according to the circumstances and time within which it is used,"
Holmes, J., in Townte v. Eisner (1918) 245 U. S. 418, 425.

COMMENT ON RECENT CASES

but in no event is he to be judged by the skill, or lack of it which
he displayed. This might seem to mean that in Massachusetts
a person operates a inotor vehicle at his peril and that the chief
protection he has, when his own due care has not met an emergency, is the possible good nature of the jury which confronts
him. In what extremes the court will permit the jury to indulge
cannot be known at this time5 and speculation is rather idle.
It is interesting to notice, however, in Commonwealth v.
8
Vartanian
that the jury found that the defendant was not guilty
of manslaughter and not guilty of operating a motor vehicle recklessly. But he was found guilty of operating "so that the lives
or safety of the public might be endangered." The trial judge
had instructed the jury among other things that: "This belongs
to a class of cases which has put the burden upon the individual
of ascertaining at his peril whether his conduct is within the
sweep of the prohibition contained in the statute." The same
judge refused defendant's request that: "The fact that an accident happened and the deceased was killed by the defendant's
truck is not enough to convict the defendant of operating so that
the lives and safety of the public might be endangered." The
Supreme Judicial Court in overruling exceptions stated specifically
that the quoted part of
7 defendant's request "was not an accurate
statement of the law."
There is at least one hope for the middle western motorist
who prefers to spend his vacation in the vicinity of Cape Cod.
The third annual report8 of the Massachusetts judicial Council
sets forth that the legislature requested a report upon the suggestion that the words willfully or negligently be added to the
statutory provision under discussion. The recommendation was
that the word negligently should be inserted in the statuteY
0
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People v.
PRoPERTY-EsTATES-CLASS-VESTING.-[Illinois]
Northern Trust Co.' involved a trust by which X, the grantor,
conveyed to trustees to collect and accumulate the income until
the death of X, but not longer than twenty-one years and at the
death of X, or, if he should be living at the end of twenty-one
years, then at the end of twenty-one years, to distribute the in-

5. Commonwealth v. Pentz (1924) 247 Mass. 500, 143 N. E. 322; Commonwealth v. Vartanian (1925) 251 Mass. 355, 146 N. E. 682; Common-

wealth v. Guillemette (1923) 243 Mass. 346, 137 N. E. 700.
6. (1925) 251 Mass. 355.

7. See also Commonwealth v. Klosek (Mass. 1928) 160 N. E. 252 (sevenyear-old girl ran out from a crowd into a street; "the question whether the
defendant did everything in his power to avoid the accident was immaterial").
8. 11 Jour. of Amer. Jud. Soc. 120.
9. Since the above was written the writer has seen a certified copy of
Ch. 281 of the Laws of Mass. for the year 1928. It therein appears that the
recommendation of the Massachusetts Judicial Council has been followed.
The amended law became effective September 1, 1928.
10. The assistance of Leon M. Despres is gratefully acknowledged.

1. (1928) 330 Ill. 238.

